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In his book, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law, Thomas Jackson asserts 
that bankruptcy law should  approximate the bargain creditors would strike at the 
initiation of the firm (T1) regarding the possibility that the firm might later fail 
and default on its debts (T2).1 Jackson reasons that the firm’s creditors would 
choose a collective remedy that limits the power of individual creditors to force an 
inefficient liquidation.  They would agree to stop the race of diligence. 
In his thoughtful and provocative contribution to this symposium, The 
Creditors’ Bargain Revisited, Barry Adler asks whether, in the current world of 
finance and bankruptcy, creditors would choose the same collective remedy?2 His 
answer is, “No.” As he sees it, creditors would prefer the unfettered right to 
exercise their negotiated remedies.3 Barry offers three pieces of evidence: (1) 
sophisticated creditors frequently say that they would prefer to opt out of 
collective bankruptcy in favor of individual collection;4 (2) creditors frequently 
seek to adopt bankruptcy remote structures such as securitization through special 
purpose vehicles to avoid the bankruptcy process;5 and (3) blanket (often second) 
lien financing is frequently used by undersecured creditors to control and 
implement an all asset sale.6 Instead, he posits his preferred, noncollective, 
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approach to insolvency: an express bargain based in creditor autonomy, or as he 
puts it, “a contractual alternative to bankruptcy.”7 
My response proceeds in three steps. First, I channel Inigo Montoya from The 
Princess Bride to suggest that the “Creditors’ Bargain” does not mean what Barry 
thinks it means.8 Second, I situate Barry’s contractualism in relation to the alternate 
“collective” theories of bankruptcy value distribution: the relativism of Baird and 
Casey; and a more rigorous version of the creditors’ bargain articulated by me and 
Melissa Jacoby in previous work.9 Third, I argue for the normative superiority of 
the collective approach, both for its fidelity to the Creditors’ Bargain heuristic and 
because of its consistency with a broader set of corporate governance norms that 
seek to encourage adequate capitalization and risk internalization.10 
I. THE ORIGINAL POSITION: THE “CREDITORS’ BARGAIN” DOES 
NOT MEAN WHAT BARRY THINKS IT MEANS 
Barry is, without a doubt, correct that creditors would prefer a debtor–creditor 
regime that leaves their individual remedies intact. However, the lesson that Barry 
derives about collective remedies rests on a misunderstanding of the nature of 
Jackson’s Creditors’ Bargain. Barry uses creditors’ expressed opinions and their 
behavior, as manifested in a number of emerging credit patterns, as evidence that 
the Jackson’s hypothetical bargain theory is wrong.11 But Jackson never claimed 
that the Creditors’ Bargain was a majoritarian rule. He never asked what creditors 
actually wanted in the real world (then or now); creditors in the real world always 
want as much as they can get, both in terms of leverage and priority. The 
Creditors’ Bargain heuristic, instead, asks what certain ideal creditors would want 
under a specific set of circumstances. 
Jackson posits a specialized version of John Rawls’s hypothesized “original 
position.” In A Theory of Justice, Rawls imagines a world where stakeholders 
bargain over the just legal regime for their society from behind a “veil of 
ignorance.”12 Jackson applies Rawls’s thought exercise to creditors, imagining the 
hypothetical bargain that would arise in T1 (the initial capitalization of the firm), 
if: (1) creditors are rational; (2) they do not know who they will be in T2 (when/if 
the firm becomes insolvent and defaults); and (3) they anticipate value destruction 
 
7 Id. at 1857. 
8 WILLIAM GOLDMAN, THE PRINCESS BRIDE 114 (Mariner Books 2007). 
9 Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward Janger, Tracing Equity: Realizing and Allocating Value in Chapter 11, 96 
TEX. L. REV. 673 (2018); see also Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of 
Process in Chapter 11 Cases, 123 YALE L.J. 862 (2014); Edward J. Janger, The Logic and Limits of Liens, 2015 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 589. 
10 See Jacoby & Janger, Tracing Equity, supra note 9, at 713. 
11 See Adler, supra note 2, at 1855-58. 
12 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118 (rev. ed. 1971). 
2019] The Creditors' Bargain Reconstituted  49 
in T2 when individual creditors rush to dismember the debtor.13 Unsurprisingly, 
Jackson concludes, that the creditors would chose a regime that solves the 
collective action problem and leads to a governance system that can achieve value 
maximization subject to Pareto superiority, thereby making all claimants better 
off.14 
Barry, by contrast, claims that actual creditor preferences are an indication of 
the failure of the creditors’ bargain heuristic.15 But Jackson was never talking about 
real world creditors; he posited “hypothetical creditors” making a hypothetical 
governance decision.16 Barry’s real-world creditors who abjure collectivism are 
not, nor do they want to be, in the “original position.” Instead, they are trying to 
break through the veil of ignorance. They seek to predetermine, in T1, who they 
will be in T2. This violates a condition essential to justifying the Creditors’ 
Bargain’s claim of normative superiority. Rawls’s theory of justice is sometimes 
referred to as, “I cut, you choose” justice. It is axiomatic that the creditor, 
bargaining in the original position for an insolvency regime, does not get to pick 
who they will be in T2. After all, the chooser always wants more pie. 
If Rawls’s assumption of ignorance is relaxed, bargaining over social welfare 
devolves into special pleading. Whether creditor preferences are welfare 
enhancing will turn on the structure of the market. If creditors know who they will 
be in T2, only three types of creditors will prefer individual action: those who can 
ensure the benefit of their bargain because they can ensure their position at the 
top of the distributional hierarchy; those who can ensure that they have sufficient 
power in T2 to solve the collective action problem all by themselves; and, even 
better, those who can do both. Barry’s first example, the ABS lender, falls into the 
first category.17 His second example, the blanket lien lender, can sometimes satisfy 
both conditions.18 As a response to this possible critique, Adler invokes Modigliani 
and Miller’s “irrelevance hypothesis,” saying the benefit offered by one 
stakeholder in return for a distributional preference will be offset when other 
stakeholders demand compensation for any additional risk.19 But this is only true 
if the bargaining in T1 is not affected by: the ability to externalize—to shift the 
cost of the risk to other parts of the capital structure; or the need of the debtor to 
signal creditworthiness by offering stronger than optimal remedies.20 Both of 
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these concerns have been raised elsewhere. Barry acknowledges the first by 
positing a priority for tort claimants over consensual liens, discussed later, and 
does not respond to the second. 
In short, Barry’s examples do not suggest that the collective remedy suggested 
by the Creditors’ Bargain heuristic is undesirable or inefficient. Indeed, quite the 
contrary, they represent examples of the race of diligence and demonstrate the 
need for a mandatory collective remedy, if anything, perhaps earlier in the process. 
II. CONTRACTUALISM, RELATIVISM, AND ABSOLUTE PRIORITY: 
“ABSOLUTE PRIORITY” DOES NOT MEAN WHAT  
BARRY THINKS IT MEANS 
In addition to value maximization, any normative theory of bankruptcy must 
address the question of value distribution: who has first claim to value of the firm? 
Here, Adler, Jackson, and the Bankruptcy Code diverge in their use of 
terminology.  The term at issue is “priority”—in particular, the term “absolute 
priority.”21 It is crucial to use those terms consistently if one is to compare 
contractual and collective proposals. 
A. Priority—Rawls, Jackson and the Butner Short-Cut 
With regard to priority, Jackson’s Creditors’ Bargain again starts with Rawls, 
but does not finish there.  Rawls used the original position to motivate the so-
called “difference principle” as a prerequisite for any inequality in resource 
allocation. He argued that a person in the original position would prefer equal 
distribution of resources, unless a proposed inequality would either benefit all, or 
at least makes nobody worse off.22 In bankruptcy, Rawls’s difference principle 
suggests that all creditors would agree to equal (proportional) distribution of assets 
in T2, unless inequality was both value-maximizing and Pareto superior. Under 
this view, the goals of value maximization and fair distribution in T2 would lead 
the bargainers in the original position to establish the limits of real world 
bargaining in T1. This would suggest imposing a condition of Pareto superiority 
on any deviation from a pari passu distribution. 
Jackson does not go this far.  In early work, Jackson famously posed the “puzzle 
of secured credit.” He asked whether secured credit was efficient, and if it was, why 
everyone didn’t use it? But neither he, nor his successors, ever answered that 
question.23 Instead, Jackson, working with Baird, found a doctrinal punt—
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federalism.  They used the so-called “Butner principle” to bracket the inquiry.24 In 
Butner, the Supreme Court stated that bankruptcy entitlements should 
presumptively track preexisting state law entitlements, unless there was a federal 
bankruptcy interest to the contrary.25 Baird and Jackson chose to assume, based on 
this dicta, that the distributional baseline should be set at the moment of 
bankruptcy by reference to existing state law entitlements.26 Deviations from the 
state law baseline should be allowed only if they were both efficiency enhancing 
and made no claimant worse off.27 This led to the primary Jacksonian distributional 
prescription—respect the priority of claims, as determined under state law, 
including those of secured creditors.28 
B. Absolute Priority—Colloquialism v. The Code 
Jackson’s prescription to respect state law entitlements is sometimes 
shorthanded as “absolute priority,” but the term is a bit of a misnomer.29 Not all 
priorities are created equal either in Jackson’s thought experiment or in the real 
world. Both Barry’s “contractualism” and his rejection of collectivism turn on a 
definition of the term “absolute priority,” that, while widely used, is not reflected 
in the Bankruptcy Code, achievable under state law, nor (though this is not Barry’s 
point) compelled by the Creditors’ Bargain.30 
Adler’s contractualism assumes a distributional scheme that is a single value 
waterfall, where “senior” creditors contract for a first priority claim to all of the 
value of the firm. This is also a feature of the terminology used by Douglas Baird 
and Anthony Casey with regard to their proposals for “option preservation” and 
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“relative” priority.31 Reducing entitlements to a single waterfall allows those 
allocating the value of a firm to focus only on one valuation question–the value of 
the firm as a going concern. The valuation methods discussed in this symposium, 
for example, have all been varieties of discounted cash flow or going concern sale 
approaches. They, too, all assume a single waterfall. 
While this use of the term “absolute priority” to reflect a single hierarchical 
priority scheme is commonplace, it is not what the term means under the 
Bankruptcy Code and case law when applied to secured creditors’ actual state law 
rights. The statutory “absolute priority rule” is embodied in 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 1129(b)(2)(B) and (C), which establish the priority of debt over equity and 
preferred equity over junior equity in cramdown. Absolute priority instantiates the 
rule, stated in Boyd, that old equity cannot participate in a bankruptcy distribution 
if a non-consenting class of unsecured creditors are not paid in full.32 
There is a similar cramdown priority rule for secured creditors, but it is not 
identical.33 The secured creditor’s priority over unsecured debt is asset-based—
limited to the value of their collateral instead of the value of the firm. While the 
amount of the debt may exceed the value of the encumbered assets, the priority 
does not. The secured creditor gets first claim to the proceeds of their collateral 
and retains a lien to the extent of that value, but any deficiency is not entitled to 
priority. In other words, on the effective date of the plan, the value of the secured 
creditor’s collateral is realized, and their lien is stripped—limited to the “allowed 
amount” of the claim. 
What, then, is the secured creditor’s collateral on the effective date? That 
question is answered by § 552 of the Code.34 Under 552(a) floating liens stop 
floating on the petition date, but, under 552(b) the creditors’ security interest 
continues in the “proceeds” of that original collateral, subject to the “equities” 
of the case.35 The secured creditor’s priority, thus, only extends to value that 
can be tied to assets liened on the petition date (because floating liens stop 
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floating) and to identifiable (traceable) proceeds of those assets (subject to the 
equities of the case).36  
This means that, if a firm continues in operation, rather than liquidating, there 
will always be two priority allocation waterfalls: one waterfall to distribute the 
realized or realizable value of encumbered assets (an “allowed secured claim”); and 
a second waterfall tied to the remaining unencumbered value of the firm 
(unsecured “claims” and equity “interests”). The second waterfall thus includes 
unencumbered assets, but also the unencumbered residual value of the firm. Even 
in the absence of unencumbered assets on the petition date, the second waterfall 
includes any going concern value of the firm, as well as any increase in value of 
the firm after original collateral is sold (“option value”). The key point here is that a 
secured creditor’s deficiency claim against the second “residual” pool of value does not have 
priority over unsecured creditors. 
In this regard, Barry’s concept of absolute priority diverges (at least as a 
terminological matter) from Jackson’s and from that of the Bankruptcy Code 
(though not from common parlance). For Barry, priority need not be tied to assets 
because it is contractual (though recourse against assets may be a way of enforcing 
that contractual priority). For Jackson, to the extent that the justification for 
secured creditor priority relies on the Butner principle, rather than an (as yet 
unspecified) efficiency rationale, the distributional baseline for the secured creditor 
would be the asset-based priority that could have been realized under state law.37 
C. Contractualism in Context 
In evaluating whether Adler’s contractualism or Jackson’s mandatory 
collective remedy is more desirable, it is necessary to place contractualism in 
context, and consider the alternatives. Barry’s contractualism is one of (at least) 
three current normative proposals regarding value distribution in bankruptcy: two 
are novel; one is statutory and historical—traditional, even. The two novel 
proposals, contractualism and relativism, require a firm embrace of the “single 
waterfall” approach. The third, embodied in the existing Code and state law, 
respects absolute priority, but recognizes the two distinct value waterfalls, one 
asset-based and one that allocates the residual value of the firm. 
 
36 Id. at 702. The priority of a secured creditor, entitled to adequate protection, is therefore limited in 
scope to the realizable value of property that can be liened and perfected under state property law (principally, 
but not exclusively, Article 9 of the UCC and state mortgage law). 
37 Whether a secured creditor “should” be able to lien all of the value of a firm under state law, is, of 
course a separate question, upon which Baird and others have strong views. Baird recognizes the asset-based 
nature of the secured claim but continues to assume the possibility of a blanket lien on going-concern value. 
Douglas G. Baird, The Rights of Secured Creditors after ResCap, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 849, 860 (noting that the 
debate over “[w]hether one looks at a secured creditor as holding the discrete parts worth less than the going 
concern or whether it enjoys a right to the first cashflows of the firm . . . will undoubtedly continue . . . . Both 
sides cling to their views as if they were articles of religious faith.”). 
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1. Single Waterfall Absolutist Contractualism 
Adler actually suggests two versions of contractualism, though both are 
versions of single waterfall absolutism. He is most attached to “equity based” 
absolutism, or as he calls it, “Chameleon Equity.”38 A creditor’s exclusive remedy 
would be the right to become an owner of the firm upon default.39 Under this 
proposal, a firm would be constructed without debt (recourse collection rights) 
but instead with convertible debt.40 On default, equity would be wiped out, debt 
would convert to equity and the creditors would gain ownership of the firm and 
would be entitled to all of the enterprise’s value.41 This structure is “absolutist” 
because it turns on the absolute priority of senior over junior. It is a single 
waterfall, because there is only one pool of value—the firm. 
Adler recognizes that this structure would not work for an operating business, 
but takes comfort that a similar structure has emerged through blanket lien asset-
based financing.42 Instead of viewing the firm as the pool of value, one views its 
assets as the pool of value, and then, slyly, declares all of the value of the firm 
“proceeds” of assets.43 This move recapitulates contractualism and can mimic 
Chameleon Equity because, when you break it down, Chameleon Equity is just an 
instant foreclosure device. And, so, as Barry observes, is much of modern 
bankruptcy practice.44 Single waterfall absolutism, and contractualism in particular, 
lead to a recreation of the race of diligence, but simply move it forward in time. 
2. Single Waterfall (Relativist) Collectivism 
Baird and Casey take a different approach to the single waterfall. They too 
assume that secured claimants have hierarchical priority over unsecured, and 
unsecureds have hierarchical priority over equity.45 More importantly, they treat 
the firm as a single value pool, making no distinction between asset-based claims 
and pari passu, value-based claims. They find themselves troubled, however, by one 
implication of single waterfall absolute priority—realization. Confirmation of a 
Chapter 11 plan (and a going concern sale of the debtor) are realization events. The 
value of the firm is realized and underwater claimants (the unsecureds) are wiped 
out. This deprives the junior creditors of the “option” to postpone reckoning 
 
38 Adler, supra note 2, at 1856; see also Barry E. Adler, A World Without Debt, 72 WASH. U. 
L. Q. 811 (1994). 
39 Adler, supra note 2, at 1856. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 1863. 
43 Id. at 1862. In a recent article Christopher Frost refers to this as “Effective Entity Priority,” and 
highlights its tenuous legal foundation. Christopher W. Frost, Secured Credit and Effective Entity Priority, 49 
CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). 
44 Adler, supra note 2, at 1863. 
45 Baird, supra note 31, at 786; Casey, supra note 29, at 763-64. 
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beyond plan confirmation. Where a firm continues in operation, as it does in 
Chapter 11 through a plan or going concern sale, there is always the chance that the 
firm will be successful enough to pay its senior creditors in full and return value to 
the juniors. They worry that under a regime of absolute priority for the secureds, 
disposition of the collateral by the secured party allocates all of the upside value of 
the firm to the seniors and wipes out the unsecureds.46 In their view, the “option 
value” is owned by the juniors and must be cashed out if the firm is sold.47 
3. Dual Waterfall (Collective) Absolutism 
Baird and Casey are right to be concerned about this implication of “single 
waterfall” absolutism, but the problem is not “absolute priority,” it is the single 
waterfall. In a recent article, Tracing Equity: Realizing and Allocating Value in Chapter 
11, Melissa Jacoby and I argue for a third approach.48 Our approach retains the 
idea of absolute priority based on state law entitlements, but recognizes that there 
are actually two waterfalls—one asset-based, and the other value-based. We 
carefully explicate the value allocation and realization rules embodied in existing 
law.49 Then, we argue (again, like Inigo Montoya) that, under current law, absolute 
priority does not mean what most people think it means.50 Then we explain the 
normative superiority of our positive version over either of the “novel” regimes 
described above; it does not wipe out the interest of the unsecureds in the value 
of the firm, nor does it deprive the secured creditor of the value of their collateral.51  
We characterize the current regime as “dual waterfall, two-point realization.”  
The first difference between us and the “single waterfallers” is our view that 
there are two distinct hierarchies applied to state law entitlements: the asset-based 
waterfall (defined in 11 U.S.C. §§ 506, 552, and 1129(b)(2)(A)); and the value-
based waterfall (defined in §§ 502, 507, and 1129(b)(2)(B)). The Bankruptcy Code 
differentiates claims with asset-based priority from claims against the residual 
value of the firm.52 Creditors with claims against specific assets lose their 
foreclosure rights but are entitled to the monetary value of their liens. Creditors 
 
46 Baird, supra note 31, at 786; Casey, supra note 29, at 764-65. 
47 Baird, supra note 31, at 791; Casey, supra note 29, at 765. Baird and Casey describe plan confirmation 
as “destroying” option value. See, e.g., Casey, supra note 29, at 760. This is a misnomer. Option value is never 
destroyed, it is simply transferred upon disposition. If collateral is sold, the purchaser receives the benefit—
and risk—of ownership. To the extent that the value of the upside is positive, that value should be realized as 
part of the purchase price. If the secured creditor wants to realize on the value of its collateral by selling the 
firm, it has to reach a deal with the juniors to purchase that option. 
48 Jacoby & Janger, Tracing Equity, supra note 9. 
49 Id. at 682-709. 
50 Id. at 678-80. 
51 Id. at 709-21. 
52 This mimics the priority for a solvent firm when it is sold. Debt claims are paid before equity. And, 
in the race of diligence, the debt claimants have recourse to the value of the assets before equity gets anything. 
Bankruptcy converts the liquidation right into a claim to residual value of the firm. 
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with no claim to specific assets have a claim to the residual assets and going-
concern value of the firm that is senior to equity. 
The second difference is that we take a different view of realization than Adler 
or Baird and Casey. In a world of blanket lien financing and underwater seconds, 
Barry’s contractual approach would treat bankruptcy as a realization moment for 
unsecureds—often taking nothing. While the secureds would have the power to 
choose between realization (sale) or ownership (plan or credit bid). Baird and Casey 
are concerned about this aspect of absolutism.53 Absolute priority turns bankruptcy, 
or at least plan confirmation into a realization event. The senior creditors gain 
ownership of the firm, while out of the money juniors are deprived of any option 
value—the upside is foreclosed. They remedy this by allocating to the unsecureds 
the value of an option on the value of the firm in excess of the secured creditors 
debt.54 In other words, the unsecured creditors retain some value, but they are 
subordinated to the undersecured blanket lien claimant’s deficiency claim. 
We, by contrast, recognize and accept that plan confirmation and/or 
disposition of the collateral operate as realization events for both secured creditors 
and unsecured creditors. Collateral disposition operates as a realization event for 
the secureds and they are entitled only to the value of their assets (including 
appreciation prior to disposition and any identifiable proceeds), while the 
unsecureds can choose, through the plan process, between realization (sale) or 
ownership (plan). The key difference between us and the single waterfallers is that, 
subject to adequate protection, any value that cannot be traced to encumbered 
assets is allocated to the estate. This includes going concern value that could not 
be realized without bankruptcy. Where there is significant going concern or 
synergistic value preserved through bankruptcy, that value is allocated to the 
unsecured creditors (including the secured creditor’s deficiency, if any). This, in 
our view, is the approach that the Bankruptcy Code envisions. Indeed, it was 
enacted at a time when asset-based lending was relatively more piecemeal than 
today. It is also more faithful to the state law baseline, and, therefore closer to the 
“Rawlsian/Jacksonian” bargain than either of the competing proposals. 
III. THE NORMATIVE SUPERIORITY OF DUAL WATERFALL 
ABSOLUTISM: THE LEGAL LIMITS OF CONTRACTUALISM 
This, of course, leads to the ultimate question: which approach is normatively 
superior? Is “dual waterfall” collectivism normatively preferable to single waterfall 
collectivism or contractualism? Again, Melissa Jacoby and I discuss this question 
in greater detail elsewhere, but I will summarize our argument here, and tie it with 
a new collectivist bow, based on the Creditors’ Bargain. 
 
53 See supra note 47. 
54 See supra note 47. 
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A. The Creditors Bargain Reconstituted 
Basic corporate finance explains that governance rights should go to the 
juniormost variable claimant who is in the money—the fulcrum. That is the 
investor who bears the downside risk and benefits from the upside. When a firm 
becomes insolvent, creditors who once thought they were fixed become variable. 
Thus, the creditors who bargain in the original position about insolvency will 
anticipate two flavors of debt claim against an insolvent debtor: “still fixed” and 
“now variable.” And, where the original position contains multiple priority levels, 
they would add a twist: “still fixed”; “now partially fixed”; and “now variable.” 
Under the law of most jurisdictions (other than the United States), insolvency 
is a realization moment for the old variable claimants (equity), but also for the fixed 
and formerly fixed claimants.55 Fiduciary duties shift, and often mandate 
commencing a bankruptcy (usually liquidation proceeding).56 In liquidation, the 
single waterfall is descriptively accurate, as all of the value is asset derived. The firm 
winds up, wiping out equity, and distributing the value of the assets first to those 
with a priority claim to the assets, and then any remainder to the residual, 
unsecured creditors. 
If, however, this immediate realization through liquidation is likely to be 
inefficient, either because it will yield fire sale prices or sacrifice going concern 
value, the creditors in the original position should want to try to come up with a 
way out of the box. They will prefer, if possible, to delay realization to maximize 
value. This is what Chapter 11 does; realization is delayed (in order to preserve 
going concern value). The question is, what treatment would be chosen for the 
senior (still fixed) and junior (now variable) by the creditors in the original 
position assuming they don’t know who they will be? 
In our view, juniors (and in an operating business there will always be 
dispersed juniors) will not agree to full subordination, because it basically turns 
them into variable claimants at the outset, but without the benefit of any upside. 
They get wiped out along with equity. Nobody would lend into such a junior 
position. In the original position, the juniors would not agree to Adler’s single 
waterfall absolutism. Instead, the argument is that they would choose a version of 
reset that will maximize the value of their now variable claim while respecting the 
rights of the seniors. 
 
55 See, e.g., Insolvency Act of 1986, c.45, § 214 (Eng.). 
56 See UNITED NATIONS, UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW, PART FOUR: 
DIRECTORS’ OBLIGATIONS IN THE PERIOD APPROACHING INSOLVENCY (2013), 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/Leg-Guide-Insol-Part4-ebook-E.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SK54-NH6Y]. 
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B. The Global Legal Norm of Adequate Capitalization 
This is where the two collective approaches diverge along the single versus dual 
waterfall axis. One must determine the extent of the seniors’ priority. We argue 
that the proper version is to reset the secured creditor’s fixed claim to the value of 
the assets and then require the juniors and the undersecured portion of the senior’s 
debt to share pari passu. This is also what the Bankruptcy Code does through 
§§ 1129(b) and 506. Baird and Casey assume that a blanket lien can encumber the 
entire value of a firm, including its going concern value, and therefore limit the 
post-default reset to the value of the firm in excess of the lienholder’s debt.57 
Our approach has three features to recommend it: (1) antijudgment proofing; 
(2) antirollup (Boyd); and (3) proper governance incentives. 
Both of the single waterfall approaches encourage judgment proofing. If a 
debtor can borrow at a low interest rate by granting priority to one creditor 
without compensating nonconsensual or nonadjusting creditors, then doing so will 
increase equity’s return on investment by artificially reducing the cost of capital. 
This point is not new. The drafters of prerevision Article 9 noted this tendency 
wistfully when they validated floating liens.58 LoPucki made the argument 
forcefully when he advocated a priority for tort claims in his articles, The Unsecured 
Creditors’ Bargain and The Death of Liability.59 Elizabeth Warren, Bebchuck, and 
Fried similarly proposed a carveout from the secured creditors’ lien to reinstate 
the lamented equity cushion.60 
 
57 Baird, supra note 31, at 802; Casey, supra note 29, at 790. 
58 Comment 2 to 9-204 provides: 
      This Article accepts the principle of a “continuing general lien”. It rejects the doctrine-of which 
the judicial attitude toward after-acquired property interests was one expression-that there is reason 
to invalidate as a matter of law what has been variously called the floating charge, the free-handed 
mortgage, and the lien on a shifting stock. This Article validates a security interest in the debtor’s 
existing and future assets, even though . . . the debtor has liberty to use or dispose of collateral 
without being required to account for proceeds or substitute new collateral . . . . 
The widespread nineteenth century prejudice against the floating charge was based on a 
feeling, often inarticulate in the opinions, that a commercial borrower should not be allowed to 
encumber all his assets present and future, and that for the protection not only of the borrower but 
of his other creditors a cushion of free assets should be preserved. That inarticulate premise has 
much to recommend it. This Article decisively rejects it not on the ground that it was wrong in policy but 
on the ground that it was not effective. 
U.C.C. § 9-204 cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1972) (emphasis added). 
59 Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 4-5 (1996) (showing that modern 
technology and lending practices, including secured credit, facilitate judgment proofing and undercut the 
effectiveness of traditional liability rules); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 
1887, 1939-40 (1994). 
60 See also Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in 
Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 859 (1996); Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy with Imperfect Information: The 
Article 9 Full Priority Debates, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1373, 1390-91 (1997). 
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Indeed, while Article 9 validates floating liens, this is only part of the picture 
with regard to adequate capitalization. One would expect that the junior creditors 
in the original position would insist that a firm that conducts business should 
maintain adequate capital to internalize the risks of its operations, both to non-
consensual creditors and those it owes a contractual obligation. The state law 
baseline is not insensitive to this. There are a wide variety of legal doctrines that 
enforce a norm of adequate capitalization through both liability and property 
rules. These include fiduciary duties, fraudulent conveyance law, and veil piercing, 
among others. Where the debtor has not retained a reasonable level of free assets 
to pay its creditors, the secured creditors’ lien may be invaded.61 
As a matter of tort theory this makes sense. If one takes a Calabresian 
perspective, the law of torts should allocate losses where the costs of bargaining 
are high and put the burden of the loss on the least cost avoider.62 The problem is 
that a liability rule offers no help, as the assets are already gone. Fraudulent 
conveyance law, fiduciary duties, and veil piercing therefore enforce this norm by 
looking to the lienholders, managers, and the owners. 
Bankruptcy law is not the only legal doctrine that limits the ability of creditors 
to contract around the separation between asset-based and value-based claims—
the dual waterfall. There are a number of anti-subordination or anti-rollup 
doctrines outside of bankruptcy. Marshalling rules for example require a creditor 
to look to assets that are not subject to a junior interest. 
The most important example of an antirollup rule is the property doctrine of 
equitable merger. When a mortgage holder comes into ownership of the fee, the 
mortgage merges into the fee and cannot be foreclosed. All of the single waterfall 
approaches violate this principle and allow the debtor to do business without 
worrying about their nonfinancial creditors.63 Where the single waterfall extends 
to all of the value of the firm, the secured creditor and the debtor have contracted 
around the doctrine of merger. They violate the spirit of Boyd in the name of 
“absolute priority.” 
Thus, the dual waterfall serves the goal of preventing rollups by preventing the 
senior creditor and the debtor from contracting around the distinction between 
financial creditors and operational creditors. It insures that the risks of operating a 
business will always remain with the juniormost claimants, and that equity will not 
be able to contract with a senior claimant to squeeze out an intermediate class. 
 
61 Jacoby & Janger, Tracing Equity, supra note 9, at 709-10. 
62 GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 58 (1970). 
63 4 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 37.32[1] (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2016). The question of whether 
a merger occurs depends on the intent of the parties. In re Apex Carpet Finishers, Inc., 585 F.2d 1323, 1325 
(5th Cir. 1978); Downstate Nat’l Bank v. Elmore, 587 N.E.2d 90, 94 (Ill. Ct. App. 1992). 
60 University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online [Vol. 167: 47 
C. The Single Waterfall in a Torts First World 
Judgment proofing is a significant fly in the contractualist ointment. Barry 
acknowledges in The Creditors’ Bargain Revisited,64 as well as in his earlier work,65 
that there is no justification for subordinating non-consensual creditors to a 
contractual waterfall. They did not assent, and they did not have notice. As such, 
the ability to shift risk to these creditors creates moral hazard. Debtors and 
consensual creditors will have an incentive to judgment proof. Accordingly, 
Barry would give involuntary claimants priority over the blanket lien creditor.66 
Here, he is undoubtedly right. However, this means that Barry’s absolutism is 
not so absolute. 
Indeed, the exception may swallow the rule. The great fear of the dual 
waterfall, as articulated by Adler, Baird, and Casey, is that it requires a costly 
valuation process. The threat of costly valuation hearings, they fear, will allow the 
juniors to extort value from the seniors. As Barry puts it, they lead to a “feast for 
lawyers”—an imbroglio.67 But Barry’s torts-first contractualism does not avoid 
valuation hearings. Once torts are at the head of the distribution queue, ahead of 
the blanket lien lender, you need to value the tort claim. This can be just as time 
consuming and messy as valuing the assets. 
How big a hole are we talking about? Perhaps large—tax claimants, utilities, 
product liability claimants, and even certain business torts. Even in the absence 
of a tort of wrongful trading or deepening insolvency, fraud, constructive 
fraudulent conveyance, and veil piercing for undercapitalization may all become 
part of the mix. In short, while this may not be a bad thing, it eliminates most of 
the benefit of contractualism or, for that matter, relativism. Once torts are put 
first, Barry’s contractualism will still require complicated ex post valuations. 
Indeed, they will likely be more complicated valuation exercises than simply 
setting the value for ascertainable assts. 
D. The Practical Limits of Absolute Priority 
There is a possible response to our view. Douglas Baird, in his article Priority 
Matters, points out that the restructurings of most modern large companies are 
purely financial, leaving the trade, the employees (at least those still employed) and 
many other junior creditors unimpaired.68 To the extent that contractualism simply 
applies to financial creditors and not to operating creditors, then the creditors are 
 
64 Adler, supra note 2, at 1856 n.10. 
65 Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. 
REV. 311 (1993). 
66 Adler, supra note 2, at 1856 n.10. 
67 Id. at 1854; see also SOL STEIN, BANKRUPTCY: A FEAST FOR LAWYERS 303 (1989). 
68 Baird, supra note 31, at 796-97. 
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free to choose between Barry’s absolutism and Baird and Casey’s relativism. If 
operational creditors are not being asked to take a haircut, it is hard to object. 
But the empirical claim appears overdrawn. Modern practice is full of devices 
that are designed to allow the debtor to choose which unsecured creditors to impair 
and which to subject to a haircut. Critical vendor motions, employee retention 
plans, and even assumption of executory contracts do allow the debtor to pay those 
creditors whose services or cooperation are essential. The problem is that not all 
modern bankruptcies are “financial,” and not all operational creditors remain 
relational at the time of bankruptcy. 
This point cuts in both directions. First, it may make restructuring too 
expensive: airline, industrial, and municipal bankruptcies are, by and large, aimed 
at addressing legacy labor issues. In those cases, where relational creditors are being 
asked to take a haircut, collectivism and the dual waterfall are crucial. Second, there 
are equality of distribution concerns. Not all relational creditors remain relational 
at the time of bankruptcy. No-longer-critical vendors get wiped out, while 
currently-critical vendors get paid in full. When operational and non-consensual 
creditors are being asked to share the burden of continuing the business, it is 
important that principles of equal treatment and best interests (Rawls’s “difference 
principle” resurfaces here) be respected, and that a pool of capital remains available 
to pay those formerly operational creditors. 
CONCLUSION 
To summarize, Barry’s report of the death of collectivism may be somewhat 
exaggerated and respect for “absolute priority” is essential. However, in neither 
case do the terms mean what Barry thinks they mean. Indeed, once they are 
properly understood, the approach followed in the Bankruptcy Code, and the 
Creditors’ Bargain, as Jacoby and I have reconstituted it, is normatively superior to 
either Barry’s contractualism or the relativists’ collectivism. 
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